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This article aims to understand when and why people accept fallacious arguments
featuring metaphors (metaphoric fallacy) as sound arguments. Two experiments were
designed to investigate, respectively, when and why participants fell into the metaphoric
fallacy. In the first experiment, participants were provided with a series of syllogisms,
presented in natural language, containing in their first premise either a lexically
ambiguous, literal middle term or a metaphorical middle term, i.e. the term that “bridges”
the first premise with the second premise, and ending with a true, false or plausible
conclusion. For each argument they were asked to evaluate whether the conclusion
followed from the premises. Results show that the metaphoric fallacy is harder to detect
in case of arguments with plausible conclusion with a conventional metaphor rather than
a novel metaphor as middle term. The second experiment investigated why participants
considered the metaphoric fallacy with plausible conclusion as a strong argument.
Results suggest that participants’ belief in the conclusion of the argument, independent
from the premises, is a predictor for committing the metaphoric fallacy. We argue that
a creative search for alternative reasons justifies participants’ falling into the metaphoric
fallacy, especially when the framing effect of a metaphor covertly influences the overall
reading of the argument. Thus, far from being a source of irrationality, metaphors might
elicit a different style of reasoning in argumentation, forcing participants to find an
alternative interpretation of the premises that guarantees the believed conclusion. In
this process, conventional metaphors are revitalized and extended through the second
premise to the conclusion, thereby entailing an overall metaphorical reading of the
argument.
Keywords: metaphor, analogy, creativity in argumentation, lexical ambiguity fallacy, belief in the conclusion
INTRODUCTION
One of the aims of argumentation theory is to provide a satisfactory explanation of how people
evaluate arguments rationally according to specific norms and standards (Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 2004; Tindale, 2006; Walton, 2006). Reasoning errors might shed light on explaining
how argumentative rationality moves away from norms and standards (Woods and Walton,
1989; Hamblin, 1970). In this perspective, it may happen to discover that laypeople are often
not rational in evaluating arguments, thus breaking normative ties and systematically falling
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into argumentation fallacies (Van Eemeren, 1992; Ariely, 2008;
Walton, 2010). As pointed out by Jonathan Evans (2014),
this does not mean that agents are (completely) irrational, as
often claimed in psychology of reasoning and decision making
(Wason, 1966; Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972). This work
attempts to suggest that they might simply be creative in
argumentation, finding alternative reasons to make sense of their
own conclusions and evaluations. For example, when someone
commits a reasoning error, this might be due to the intuitive
search for alternative reasons, especially in the case of non-literal
language used in argumentation. Here, the term “argumentation”
is used in an intuitive sense, as covering any conveying of
alleged reasons in support of conclusions that a speaker wishes
the interlocutor to draw from some premises. In this intuitive
sense, argumentation is strictly bound to reasoning as the activity
of evaluating and justifying a conclusion on the basis of its
putative grounds and warrants. Our research aims to show
that, especially in the case of arguments featuring metaphors,
ordinary evaluations make use of other sources of reasoning,
independent from the argument itself, i.e., actual premises and
their connection to the conclusion. Far from being just a source of
fallacies, metaphors thus become a cue to creative argumentation.
Challenging the classical view of rationality, the so-called
paradigm of bounded rationality (Simon, 1983; Gigerenzer
and Selten, 2002; Kahneman, 2003) showed that in most
cases humans largely make use of unconscious and automatic
intuitions, while reasoning is used merely to offer post hoc
rationalizations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Evans, 2008;
Evans and Frankish, 2009). Reasoning errors do have a
psychological dimension (Walton, 2010, p. 159; see also Macagno
and Walton, 2010; Godden, 2015), as they are arguments that
for some reasons “seem to be sound without being so in fact,”
where “an argument is sound if it is valid, i.e., it is impossible
that its premises are true and its conclusion false, and its premises
are true” (Etchemendy, 1990, p. 29). According to this point of
view, the perceived truth or falsity of the premises represents
an important step toward the comprehension of arguments.
However, when argumentation exploits the characteristic lexical
ambiguity and polysemy of natural language, a robust notion
of truth begins to waver. Arguments in natural language often
feature loose uses of language, as for instance metaphors, which
are “truth independent” (Clark, 1994; Wilson and Sperber, 2002).
Previous research shows that the majority of sentences with
conventional metaphors are perceived as true, even though they
are literally false (Glucksberg, 2001, 2003; Giora, 2003) and the
availability of context influences the perception of truth especially
in case of novel metaphor (Gildea and Glucksberg, 1983;
Glucksberg and Estes, 2000; Bambini et al., 2016). Therefore,
the process of interpretation of the premises of a syllogism
featuring a metaphor could possibly influence the evaluation of
the soundness of the whole argument.
According to the classical pragmatic view (Grice, 1989),
sentences featuring a metaphor are considered as literally
“patently” false, because of their conventional meaning, and urge
for the search of the implicit meaning that better fits the context.
Therefore, metaphors might lead to fallacies of reasoning because
of meaning ambiguity (Barnden, 2012; Fischer, 2015) and of
heuristic rules that never guarantee the preservation of truth
(Fischer, 2014; Keefer and Landau, 2016). Indeed, metaphors
not only provide arguments with economy of language, greater
vividness, interestingness, forcefulness, but also entail a framing
effect that implicitly provides a specific perspective to interpret
the world. Previous literature claimed that metaphors are a
framing strategy through which a (generally more abstract and
less known) target conceptual domain is seen in the light of a
(generally more concrete and better known) source conceptual
domain (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 1994; Coulson, 2001;
Bowdle and Gentner, 2005). Some relevant properties of the
source domain are selected to understand the target domain,
but in projecting those properties into the target domain, other
properties remain underrated or simply hidden. The mapping
of properties from the source to the target implicitly forces
the interpreter to consider the target in a specific perspective.
Therefore, different metaphorical views might seriously affect
one’s reasoning and evaluation of arguments (Lakoff, 2004;
Goatly, 2007; Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011, 2013; Steen et al.,
2014; Semino et al., 2016).
However, precisely these features of metaphors have been said
to have elicited a more creative and productive argumentation
style, in a number of scientific disciplines ranging from physics
and biology (Black, 1962; Hesse, 1963; Kuhn, 1979; Pulaczewska,
2011), to psychology (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Indurkhya
and Ojha, 2013) and problem solving (Leung et al., 2012; Keefer
et al., 2014). Metaphors are indeed based on a cross-domain
mechanism of projection (mapping), which preserves relations
from a source to a target domain, thus favoring analogical
reasoning (Gentner et al., 2001; Wolff and Gentner, 2011;
Gentner and Asmuth, 2017). In this regard, a metaphor should
not be interpreted as a trap leading to fallacies, but as a helpful
means to achieve creative thinking (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995;
Hofstadter, 1995; Hallyn, 2000; Castro and Marcos, 2011). Far
from being just a source of fallacies in reasoning, metaphors
might then play a constructive role in reasoning, by enhancing
their creative power (Indurkhya, 2007a, 2010). Reconsidering
traditional approaches to metaphor as a reasoning device (Black,
1962; Hesse, 1963, 1965; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969),
recent studies claimed that metaphors might be seen as a
“condensed analogy” or an “implicit argument” by analogy where
some inferences can be drawn from the comparison between the
similarities of a source and a target domain (Santibáñez, 2010;
Macagno and Zavatta, 2014; Oswald and Rihs, 2014; Svacˇinova,
2014; Wagemans, 2016).
LOGIC AND BELIEF IN REASONING
WITH METAPHORS
The similarities between metaphor and analogy have been
discussed at both the theoretical and the experimental level. In
psychology of reasoning, for instance, Dedre Gentner and her
colleagues explicitly stated that “metaphor is like analogy – that
the basic processes of analogy are at work in metaphor” (Gentner
et al., 2001, p. 243). Like analogies, metaphors are processed as
systems of relations, where both the target and the source terms
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“refer to specific concepts from different semantic domains, and
the metaphor is interpreted by aligning the two representations
and importing further predicates from the base [source] to the
target.” Analogical reasoning thrives on comparisons that are
quite frequent in everyday language and play an important role
in human reasoning (Vosniadou and Ortony, 1989; Holyoak and
Thagard, 1995; Gentner et al., 2001; Shelley, 2003). Metaphors –
because of their intrinsic meaning ambiguity – might influence
the proper attribution of a certain analogy as a basis for
its conclusion. In analogical reasoning featuring a metaphor,
it might be argued that a comparison between A and B is
established, where A and B share a set X of relevant properties.
The relevant properties shared between the target A and the
source B of a metaphor are all the properties belonging to the
source B that can be mapped onto the target A. Especially in
the case of conventional metaphors, the set of relevant properties
is given by a “system of associated commonplaces” that usually
are assumed to hold true about the source B, applicable to the
target and integrated within semantic memory structure (Black,
1954; Gibbs, 1994; Glucksberg, 2003; Bowdle and Gentner, 2005;
Kenett et al., 2018). For instance, when we say that “A lawyer is a
shark,” we are not claiming that sharks and lawyers share exactly
all and the same properties, but rather that a lawyer is comparable
to a shark on the basis of a certain set of relevant properties X,
including the property of “being aggressive” typically associated
with the concept of “shark.” Based on this comparison, if B has
the relevant property C belonging to the set X, then it is fair to
conclude that A also has the property C. Therefore, given that “A
shark is aggressive,” as per analogy, we should conclude that “A
lawyer is aggressive”:
(1) [P1] A lawyer is a shark.
[P2] A shark is aggressive.
[C] A lawyer is aggressive.
The first premise of the syllogism contains the term “shark,”
used with a metaphorical meaning, which also acts as middle term
of the syllogism, i.e., the term that appears in both the premises
of the syllogism, but not in the conclusion and that (properly)
connects the premises. The second premise of the syllogism
specifies the property on the basis of which the conclusion of the
analogical argument is (properly) drawn.
Indeed, a fallacious analogical argument (see Holland et al.,
1986 for an extensive account) establishes a faulty analogy as its
conclusion, “assuming that it is highly probable there will be some
other shared property in a class so wide that there is only a low
initial probability of finding any other shared properties relevant
to the purpose at hand” (Fearnside and Holther, 1959, p. 4; but see
also Bartha, 2010; Macagno et al., 2014, 2017; Macagno, 2017a).
In case the property C is not included in the set X of properties
belonging to both the target and the source as relevant for the
conventional metaphorical meaning, as for instance the literal
property of “being a fish,” a faulty analogy drives to the conclusion
“A lawyer is a fish”:
(2) [P1] A lawyer is a shark.
[P2] A shark is a fish.
[C] A lawyer is a fish.
In such a case, there is a shift in the meaning of the middle
term “shark” from the first to the second premise, where the
property belonging just to the source “shark” cannot be applied
to the target “lawyer.” Therefore, the analogical reasoning is not
guaranteed and the argument is fallacious because it contains
four terms instead of three terms. In other words, because of the
shift in the meaning of the term “shark,” from the metaphorical
to the literal one, the argument assumes the structure of a
quaternio terminorum (Barth, 1974; Macagno and Walton, 2009;
Ervas et al., 2018). Quaternio terminorum is a well known
case of a fallacious argument based on the lexical ambiguity of
its middle term, which assumes different meanings in the two
premises (Hamblin, 1970; Woods and Walton, 1989; Copi et al.,
2014). If the middle term assumes a different meaning in each
premise, then a syllogism, de facto, contains a fourth, hidden
term, which causes the fallacy. We will call “metaphoric fallacy” a
quaternio terminorum based on a lexical ambiguity generated by
a metaphor in the first premise of the argument.
Exploiting analogies, metaphors bring together objects
belonging to different semantic fields, i.e., lawyers and sharks,
which might not have been previously related in any way.
From this perspective, metaphors have the power to generate
new similarities, triggering certain properties of the source as
relevant, even if those same properties were not relevant before.
The process of selecting the relevant properties is creative in
nature as it gives access to new categorizations (Bowdle and
Gentner, 1999, 2005; Glucksberg, 2001, 2008), even though
possibly conventionalized by continued usage. For instance,
metaphors such as “Lawyers are sharks” can be read as “class-
inclusion statements” (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg,
2008), if we think of a “shark” as the name of the set whose
members display aggressive behavior. Certainly, the statement
“Lawyers are sharks” is literally false, if we think of a “shark”
as a fish. In this case we are inclined to judge the related
argument as fallacious not only because of the irrelevant property
“being a fish” in the second premise and/or to the patent
literal falsity of the first premise featuring the metaphor, but
also because of the patent literal false conclusion: “A lawyer
is a fish.” In case of quaternio terminorum with plausible
conclusion, the latter effect might be reduced. This fact produces
metaphoric fallacies that may appear prima facie strong, i.e.,
sound arguments with true premises, but actually based on
metaphor-related ambiguity of meaning, as in the following
examples:
(3) [P1] A lawyer is a shark.
[P2] A shark takes advantage of others.
[A] lawyer takes advantage of others.
(4) [P1] A lawyer is a shark.
[P2] A shark circumvents obstacles.
[C] A lawyer circumvents obstacles.
The plausible conclusion is given by the fact that the second
premise makes a property explicit, which belongs exclusively
to the target (“taking advantages from others” in argument 3)
and it is not part of the relevant set of X properties shared
by both the target and the source, or a property that is not
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essentially or typically associated to the target nor to the
source (“circumventing obstacles” in argument 4) (“emergent
properties,” see for instance Gineste et al., 2000; Fauconnier and
Turner, 2002; Indurkhya, 2006).
We expected that, in case of a plausible, or at least a
conceivable conclusion, the participants might be more careful
in evaluating the connection between premises, instead of
directly discarding the argument as fallacious on the basis
of the patent falsity of its conclusion. In fact, a number
of studies on syllogistic reasoning show that the believability
of the conclusion strongly influences the evaluation of an
argument (Evans et al., 1983; Oakhill et al., 1989; Oakhill
and Garnham, 1993; Ball et al., 2006; Correia, 2011). In
particular, previous experiments on the “belief-bias” effect in
reasoning have emphasized that when presented with deductive
arguments to evaluate, participants utter their judgments relying
on a priori beliefs, rather than on the basis of the arguments
themselves. Specifically, irrespective of the actual soundness
of the argument, the tendency is to endorse those arguments
whose conclusions they believe in and reject those arguments
whose conclusions they do not believe in. Some studies (Evans
et al., 1983; Correia, 2011) found that, depending on the form
of the argument, a conflict between logic and belief might be
observed throughout, and at several levels of extent. Other studies
(Oakhill et al., 1989; Oakhill and Garnham, 1993; Ball et al.,
2006) also showed that beliefs in the conclusion may affect the
examination of alternative reasons and act as a filter on putative
conclusions.
CURRENT RESEARCH
To the best of our knowledge, however, previous research
on argument evaluation interfering with people’s beliefs did
not contemplate metaphors in the premises, considering just
argument expressed in plain, literal language. Being framing
strategies, metaphors might also have a strong influence on
the beliefs involved in an argument’s evaluation process. In
particular, we expected that the framing effect of metaphor
might also depend on the type of metaphor featured in the
first premise of the argument. In fact, conventional metaphors
are not perceived as metaphors, bearing a status similar to
polysemous literal term (Carston, 2002; Giora, 2003; Bowdle
and Gentner, 2005; Kenett et al., 2018), and unconsciously act
as triggers of “systems of commonplaces” or background of
associated beliefs (Black, 1954; Coulson, 2001; Lakoff, 2004;
Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011, 2013). Novel metaphors,
however, are consciously processed as metaphors and require
new, original and creative interpretations (Indurkhya, 2007b,
2010; Kenett et al., 2018). We therefore expected a major
influence of conventional metaphors in the evaluation of
arguments, when compared with novel metaphors, as in
the latter case participants are aware of the falsity both of
premises and of the deviant, creative interpretation of the
conclusion.
Two experimental studies were designed to address the
following questions:
(Q1) Are people more prone to commit a faulty
analogy/quaternio terminorum fallacy in case of literal
terms or in case of metaphors?
(Q2) Does the conventionality of metaphors play any role in case
of a metaphoric fallacy?
(Q3) What are the reasons for people to commit a metaphoric
fallacy?
(Q4) What is the role of belief in the conclusion in the case of
metaphoric fallacy?
The first experiment is designed to answer Q1 and Q2, while
the second experiment is aimed to answer Q3 and Q4.
EXPERIMENT 1
In the first experimental study we tested participants’ evaluation
of arguments having the standard syllogistic form, comparing
literal and metaphorical middle terms. In the case of literal
middle terms, their literal meanings in the premises could diverge
either because they were homonymous (H), with two completely
different literal meanings, or because they were polysemous
(P), with two partially overlapping literal meanings. In case
of metaphorical middle terms, their metaphorical meaning in
the first premise could diverge from the literal meaning in the
second premise either because they were conventional metaphors
(CM), with the metaphorical meaning already classified in the
dictionary, or because they were novel metaphors (NM), with the
metaphorical meaning created from anew.
Design and Predictions
The experimental design included three sets of arguments
(argument structure condition) combined with H, P, CM, and NM
middle terms (middle term condition):
(1) strong arguments (6 × H, P, CM, NM middle terms) with
true-perceived premises and true-perceived conclusion,
where the middle terms were used with the same meaning
in the premises;
(2) standard quaternio terminorum (6 × H, P, CM, NM
middle terms) with true-perceived premises and false-
perceived conclusion, where the middle terms were used
with different meanings in the premises;
(3) quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion (6 × H, P,
CM, NM middle terms) with true-perceived premises and
plausible-perceived conclusion, where the middle terms
were used with different meanings in the premises.
Fillers included a set of 25 clearly strong arguments and
25 clearly weak arguments. Fillers were designed to check
participants’ understanding of the task they were assigned and
basic capacity to distinguish between a clearly strong and a clearly
weak argument, without any explicit instruction.
Overall, the study had a 3× 4 experimental design: 3 argument
structure conditions× 4 (H, P, CM, NM) middle term conditions.
The main effects and possible interaction effect of the two factors
(type of argument structure and type of middle term) were
planned to be analyzed via a preliminary two-factor ANOVA.
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A series of paired t-test were planned to better understand
which conditions had the greatest influence on participants’
evaluation of the arguments. Overall, we had the following main
expectations:
(1) A main effect of the argument structure was expected, as
the type of conclusion might force the participants to check
whether the first and the second premise are connected by a
middle term properly used with the same meaning in both
the premises. In particular, quaternio terminorum with
plausible conclusions was expected to be more difficult to
detect when compared to strong arguments, where middle
terms need no disambiguation process, and to standard
quaternio terminorum, where the patently false conclusion
might, per se, help participants to detect the fallacy.
(2) A main effect of the middle term was also expected, as
the type of middle term might require specific lexical
disambiguation process of the meanings in the premises.
More specifically, H and NM middle terms were expected
to be easier to disambiguate but longer to process in
quaternio terminorum as the divergent meanings in the
first and in the second premise belong to radically
different and not previously associated semantic domains,
while P and CM middle terms were expected to be
more difficult to disambiguate but shorter to process in
quaternio terminorum as the divergent meanings in the
first and in the second premise belong to overlapping
semantic domains. However, NM middle terms were
expected to be more difficult to process when compared
to CM middle terms, because novel metaphors are,
per definition, unfamiliar, and require wider contexts to
be more meaningful and easily understandable, when
compared to conventional metaphors, which are lexicalized
and very familiar.
(3) A significant interaction between the argument structure
and the middle term factors was expected, as a specific
lexical disambiguation process of the meanings in the
premises is required when the participants needs to check
for the possible divergence of meanings in order to evaluate
whether the conclusion actually follows from the premises.
In particular, we also expected that the framing effect of
metaphorical middle terms might interfere with the level of
accuracy in the evaluation of arguments.
Participants
A total of 147 adults (93 women, 54 men, Mage = 25.03 years,
SDage = 8.9 years) participated in the experiment. We accepted
only those participants whose response to the fillers were
correct (acceptance threshold: 90% of correct answers): 19
participants were excluded from the analysis as untrusted
participants. All the participants had Italian as their first language
and normal/corrected vision. All of them were undergraduate
students in Languages and Communication Studies recruited
at the University of Cagliari, who did not previously follow
any course in logic and/or argumentation theory. The study
was approved by the ethics committee of the Department of
Education, Psychology, Philosophy at the University of Cagliari
and written informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Materials
The stimulus material consisted of N (=122 arguments in Italian,
including 50 fillers (see Appendix, Supplementary Table 10). To
provide the materials for the experiment we previously selected
a set of terms (= 206 nouns) that could be used to form H, P,
CM, NM middle terms, from the GRADIT (De Mauro, 2000).
We devised the arguments on the basis of the middle terms
selected from a series of rating studies. In all the arguments with
CM and NM middle terms, we made sure that the metaphor
appeared in the first premise. We used unambiguous terms to
build novel metaphors, checking in the GRADIT that they were
not previously used as conventional metaphors.
In case of strong arguments with CM middle terms, we built
the second premise following the figurative meaning lexicalized
in the GRADIT, in order to have the same (metaphorical)
meaning in both the premises and the property in the second
premise belonging to the source and applicable to the target.
In case of strong arguments with NM middle terms, we
followed the same procedure, but we checked that the figurative
meaning was not already lexicalized in the GRADIT, and anyway
understandable for participants.
In case of standard quaternio terminorum with CM and NM
middle terms, we built the second premise following the literal
meaning in the GRADIT, in order to have divergent meanings in
the premises and the property in the second premise belonging
just to the source and not applicable to the target. In case of
quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion with CM and
NM middle terms, we built the second premise in the same way
but making sure that the conclusion would not appear patently
false.
An example in English for each condition is given in
Supplementary Table 1 (see Appendix for the table of all the
material in Italian, Supplementary Table 10).
Rating and Pilot Studies
We pre-tested (1) the middle terms, (2) the metaphors in the
first premises and (3) the separate premises/conclusions of the
arguments in a series of rating studies (Nparticipants = 209).
Middle Terms
We selected the middle terms according to their number of
letters and frequency (all common terms in the GRADIT, De
Mauro, 2000), their emotional (positive and negative) meaning
and familiarity by using a 1 (very negative/very unfamiliar) to
5 (very positive/very familiar) rating scale. We eliminated the
terms with definite emotional meanings (Mpositive meaning > 4;
Mnegative meaning < 2) and insufficient familiarity (Mfamiliarity < 3)
(see Supplementary Table 2).
Metaphors
We tested conventional and novel metaphors along some
major psycholinguistic variables (Bambini et al., 2014):
emotional (positive and negative) meaning, familiarity,
meaningfulness (i.e., confidence in metaphor interpretation)
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and comprehension difficulty by using a 1 (very negative/very
unfamiliar/very meaningless/very easy) to 5 (very positive/very
familiar/very meaningful/very difficult) rating scale. We
eliminated the metaphors with definite emotional meanings
(Mpositive meaning > 4; Mnegative meaning < 2), metaphors with
insufficient meaningfulness (Mmeaningfulness < 3) and metaphors
that were too difficult to understand (Mcomprehension difficulty > 4)
(see Supplementary Table 3). When compared to conventional
metaphors, novel metaphors were rated as less familiar
(p < 0.001) and more difficult to understand (p < 0.01), even
though the latter results might have been mitigated by a wider
context. Participants also felt less confident in the interpretations
they gave to novel metaphors than to conventional metaphors
(p < 0.01), whose frequent use instead presumably increases
participants’ confidence. We did not check for the salience of
the properties and properties coherence (Weiland et al., 2014) of
the metaphors and this is a limitation that might be particularly
relevant when having different figures of the syllogism and
thus different directionalities of the argument (Dickstein, 1978;
Oberauer et al., 2005) interfering with metaphor directionality.
In the present study we just made sure that the same structure of
the syllogism was maintained.
Premises and Conclusions
We tested the premises of the arguments to make sure that the
participants attributed either the same meaning to the middle
terms in case of strong arguments or different meanings in case
of fallacious arguments. We also tested the premises separately,
in order to understand whether they were perceived as either
true or false, and the conclusions to understand whether they
were perceived as true, false or plausible. We asked participants
to verbalize why they perceived premises as false, to avoid false
premises that would lead to an “ex falso quodlibet,” and we
accepted only those premises that were perceived true. The results
showed that 83% of the premises with conventional metaphors
were perceived as true, while 79% premises with novel metaphors
were actually perceived as false (Ervas and Ledda, 2014). A pilot
study (Nparticipants = 40), excluding novel metaphors for this
reason, showed a significant effect of conventional metaphors
in the evaluation of arguments with plausible conclusion (Ervas
et al., 2015). However, we included novel metaphors in the
present experiment, because in case of premises with novel
metaphors, explanations were offered by participants in order to
finally consider them as true premises.
Procedure
Participants sat in front of a computer in a quiet room. All
the participants were tested on Microsoft Windows 7 32-bit
Professional Edition. We used PsychoPy 1.81.00 to collect the
participants’ answers and response time. The arguments were
randomized and visually presented on the computer screen. After
gathering initial information about language and education, the
participants were asked to read the instructions and complete
four practice trials to familiarize them with the task. After
presenting the argument on the screen without the middle
term, the participants pressed the bar when they were ready
to read the middle term (target word), and then the argument
disappeared from the screen and the target word appeared for
500 ms on the screen. Then the participants were asked to
answer “YES” or “NO” to the following question: “Does the
conclusion follow from the premises?”. To evaluate the strength
of the arguments, i.e., whether the conclusion [C] follows from
the premises [P1] and [P2], we asked the participants a yes/no
question by clicking on a “YES” button if they thought that [C]
did follow from [P1] and [P2], or a “NO” button otherwise. We
registered the “YES”/”NO” answers and the response times from
the disappearance of the target word. The overall test lasted for a
maximum of 35 min.
Results
All data were collected at the following address: osf.io/3k27d/.
A two-way ANOVA test for accuracy and response times was
performed to assess the main effects of the argument structure
type and the middle term type and the interaction of the two
factors on the evaluation of the arguments (see Supplementary
Table 4).
A series of paired t-tests, corrected for multiple comparisons,
were performed to determine the statistical significance. For data
analysis, we used the following open source Python packages:
sqlalchamy, numpy and scipy. All the results are available
at the following address: osf.io/3k27d/. Mean and standard
deviation for correct answers and response times are reported in
Supplementary Table 5.
Correct Answers
Overall the results showed a significant main effect of the
argument type [F(2,144) = 338.3; p < 0.01] and the middle
term type [F(3,143) = 72.10; p < 0.01], as well as a significant
interaction of the argument type and the middle term type
[F(6,140) = 61.10; p < 0.01] on participant’s evaluation of the
arguments (see Supplementary Table 4). The significant main
effect of the argument type is due to the lower number of correct
answers in the case of quaternio terminorum with plausible
conclusion condition when compared to both strong argument
[t(145) = 17.72; p < 0.001] and standard quaternio terminorum
[t(145) = 12.55; p < 0.001] conditions. The significant main effect
of the middle term type is due to the higher level of accuracy
in the case of H middle terms when compared to all the other
(P/CM/NM) middle term conditions (p < 0.001) and the lower
level of accuracy in the case of NM middle terms when compared
to all the other (H/P/CM) middle term conditions (p < 0.001)
(see Supplementary Table 6).
Overall, arguments with literal (H and P) middle terms
received a significantly higher number of correct answers
compared to arguments with metaphorical (CM and NM) middle
terms [t(145) = 9.11; p < 0.001]. In particular, literal (H and P)
middle terms received a significantly higher number of correct
answers compared to arguments with metaphorical (CM and
NM) middle terms in case of strong arguments [t(145) = 15.57;
p < 0.001] and in the case of quaternio terminorum with
plausible conclusion [t(145) = 6.89; p< 0.001], while the difference
was not significant in case of standard quaternio terminorum
[t(145) =−1.39; p = 1.01].
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Interestingly, in case of strong arguments with CM middle
terms, a significantly higher number of participants considered
the conclusion as following from the premises, compared
to NM middle term condition [t(145) = 16.83; p < 0.001].
Strong arguments with P literal middle terms received a
significantly higher number of correct answers compared to
both metaphorical CM middle terms [t(145) = 7.87; p < 0.001]
and NM middle terms [t(145) = 25.058; p < 0.001] conditions,
while in case of standard quaternio terminorum with false
conclusion, they received a significantly lower number of correct
answers compared to both H literal middle terms condition
[t(145) = −6.89; p < 0.01] and metaphorical CM middle terms
[t(145) =−4.86; p < 0.001] and NM middle terms [t(145) =−7.03;
p < 0.001] conditions. No significant difference was observed
between standard quaternio terminorum with CM and NM
middle terms (see Supplementary Table 7).
In case of quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion,
arguments with H literal middle terms received a significantly
higher number of correct answers compared to arguments with
metaphorical CM middle terms [t(145) = 13.58; p < 0.001] and
NM middle terms [t(145) = 9.98; p < 0.001], while arguments
with P literal middle terms received a significant higher number
of correct answers just in comparison to CM middle terms
[t(145) = 3.62; p < 0.01]. In the case of quaternio terminorum
with plausible conclusion, no significant difference was observed
between P and NM middle terms, while, interestingly, a
significant difference was found between CM and NM middle
terms due to the lower number of correct answers in the case
of CM middle terms condition [t(145) = −3.32; p < 0.05) (see
Supplementary Table 7).
Response Time
The response time results for correct answers showed a significant
main effect of the argument type [F(2,144) = 3.94; p = 0.02]
and middle term type [F(3,143) = 10.56; p < 0.01], as well
as a significant interaction of the argument type and middle
term type [F(6,140) = 22.74; p < 0.01] (see Supplementary
Table 4). The significant effect of the argument type is due
to the higher response time for the participants’ evaluation of
quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion compared to
strong arguments [t(145) = 4.07; p < 0.001]. The significant effect
of the middle term type is due to the higher response time for
participants’ evaluation of arguments with NM middle terms
[t(145) = 3.3; p < 0.01] and lower response time for arguments
with H middle terms [t(145) = −2.98; p < 0.05] as compared to
the response time registered for the evaluation of arguments with
P middle terms (see Supplementary Table 6).
Response time analysis also showed that participants took
longer to evaluate strong arguments with metaphorical than
literal middle terms [t(145) = 7.02; p < 0.001], they took
less time in case of standard quaternio terminorum with
metaphorical than literal middle terms [t(145) =−3.26; p = 0.008].
No significant difference was instead observed in response
times when comparing quaternio terminorum with plausible
conclusion with metaphorical vs. literal middle terms. In the case
of strong arguments with literal middle terms, participants took
longer to evaluate arguments with H middle terms as compared
to P middle terms [t(145) = 12.53; p < 0.001] (see Supplementary
Table 6). In the case of strong arguments with metaphorical
middle terms, participants took longer to evaluate arguments
with NM middle terms than P middle terms [t(145) = 8.57;
p < 0.001] and H middle terms [t(145) = 3.70; p < 0.05], but took
less time to evaluate arguments with CM middle terms than P
middle terms [t(145) = −15.1; p < 0.001]. In the case of standard
quaternio terminorum, higher response time was registered for
participants’ evaluation of arguments with P middle terms than
H middle terms [t(145) = 4.10; p < 0.01] and NM middle terms
[t(145) = 5.57; p < 0.001]. In the case of standard quaternio
terminorum with metaphorical middle terms, participants took
longer to evaluate arguments with CM middle terms compared to
P middle terms [t(145) = 5.51; p < 0.001]. In the case of quaternio
terminorum with plausible conclusion, evaluation of arguments
with NM middle terms required higher response time compared
to both the arguments with P middle terms [t(145) = 3.22;
p < 0.01] and the arguments with CM middle terms [t(145) = 1.8;
p < 0.05] (see Supplementary Table 8).
The response time results for wrong answers showed a
significant main effect of the argument type [F(2,144) = 8.69;
p < 0.01] and middle term type [F(3,143) = 7.10; p < 0.01],
as well as a significant interaction of the argument type
and middle term type [F(6,140) = 4.60; p < 0.01] (see
Supplementary Table 4). Response time analysis for wrong
answers revealed that higher response time was required for
standard quaternio terminorum than quaternio terminorum with
plausible conclusion [t(145) = 3.03; p< 0.05], (see Supplementary
Table 6). Response time analysis for wrong answers also showed
that participants took shorter to evaluate strong arguments with
metaphorical than literal middle terms [t(145) = −2.66; p = 0.05],
while no significant difference was observed in response times
when comparing quaternio terminorum with metaphorical vs.
literal middle terms. In general, higher response time for wrong
answers was registered in case of arguments with H middle
terms as compared to both arguments with P middle terms
[t(145) = 3.62; p < 0.01] and arguments with CM middle terms
[t(145) = 3.06; p < 0.05] (see Supplementary Table 6). In case of
strong argument, higher response time for wrong answers was
taken just in case of arguments with H middle terms as compared
to arguments with P middle terms [t(145) = 4.05; p < 0.01].
No significant difference was observed for fallacious arguments
(standard quaternio terminorum and quaternio terminorum
with plausible conclusion).
Discussion
In Experiment 1, the significant main effect of the argument
structure type on the evaluation of the arguments and the
comparison among argument structure conditions seem to
suggest that quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion are
more difficult to identify compared to both strong arguments,
whose middle terms do not require any disambiguation process,
and standard quaternio terminorum, whose patently false
conclusion might have helped participants in detecting the
fallacy. The plausibility of the conclusion might have led
participants to consider the quaternio terminorum structure
more similar to the structure of a strong argument, thus
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explaining the higher number of wrong answers and lower
response time for wrong answers when compared to the
evaluation of standard quaternio terminorum. Moreover, the
plausible conclusion might have forced participants to check for
the different meanings of the middle term in both the premises,
thus explaining the higher response time for participants’
evaluation of quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion
compared to strong arguments where the middle term is used
with one and the same meaning.
The significant main effect of the middle term type on
participants’ evaluations of the arguments suggests the relevance
of the lexical disambiguation process required to understand
the possible divergence of the meanings of the middle term
in the premises. A disambiguation process, both in the case
of literal and metaphorical middle terms, is indeed required to
understand whether the premises are properly connected by the
same meaning of the middle term in both the premises as in
the case of strong arguments, or the premises are improperly
connected by a middle term having different meanings in the
premises as in the case of quaternio terminorum. Overall,
the results support the idea that, overall, literal middle terms
are easier to be disambiguated compared to metaphorical
middle term, where an inferential step to the metaphorical
meaning is required (Grice, 1989). Even in the case of
strong argument, where the middle term is used with the
same meaning, participants performed worst in the case of
metaphorical than literal middle terms and took longer to
evaluate strong arguments with metaphorical than literal middle
terms. In the case of standard quaternio terminorum, this
difference is probably mitigated by the clearly false conclusion,
which per se might have led participants to detect the fallacy,
independently from the (literal or metaphorical) nature of the
middle term.
In any case, H middle terms are by far the easiest to be
disambiguated, even when compared to literal P middle terms
(see Supplementary Table 6). Indeed, in the case of H middle
term, the different literal meanings are clearly divergent, and the
disambiguation process requires a straightforward suppression
of one of its two literal meanings, namely the irrelevant one
(Gernsbacher, 1990; Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991). In the
case of P middle term, there is instead a list of possible,
partially overlapping meanings that might be selected (Gick
and Holyoak, 1983; Gentner et al., 1993). Higher response
time for H middle term condition than for P middle term
condition suggests that, in the case of H middle terms, two
completely different meanings need to be processed, while
in the case of P middle terms just divergent properties of
the same meaning need to be processed to evaluate the
argument. Indeed, even though in both H disambiguation and
P interpretation a suppression process is required (Gernsbacher
and Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher et al., 2001; Rubio Fernandez,
2007), in P the meanings of the middle term share some
semantic properties as they overlap, while in H the suppressed
meaning has no semantic relation with the contextually relevant
one.
In the case of metaphorical middle term, the literal and the
non-literal meanings possibly share some properties, which allow
metaphorical understanding. Also in the case of metaphors, the
properties of the literal linguistically encoded concept are active
in the early phases of lexical access (Weiland et al., 2014), when
some properties of the linguistically encoded concept are selected
to understand the communicated (“ad hoc”) concept (Glucksberg
et al., 2001; Rubio Fernandez, 2007). In lexical pragmatics
(Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004, 2010), a process of modulation
(narrowing or broadening) has been proposed to explain the
selection of the relevant meaning in both P and CM, where the
concept communicated by a term has more restricted (lexical
narrowing) or more general (lexical broadening) interpretation
than the linguistically encoded concept. For instance, to
understand the metaphor “Lawyers are sharks,” we select the
properties of the literal, linguistically encoded concept “shark”
that are required to grasp the ad hoc concept, i.e., being
aggressive, engaged in constant struggle, etc. Other irrelevant
properties of the linguistically encoded concept “shark,” as for
instance “being a fish,” are suppressed. This process is particularly
crucial when assessing arguments with P and CM middle terms,
where the property made explicit in the second premise might
belong to the set of (ir)relevant properties of the middle term that
(im)properly connect the premises of the argument. This process
might therefore be a source of mistakes, when not carefully
controlled, in evaluating whether the conclusion follows from the
premises, and might explain the shorter response times for P and
CM middle terms in the case of wrong answers compared to H
middle terms (see Supplementary Table 6).
However, the results also show that the participants performed
better when evaluating strong arguments with P middle terms
than metaphorical (CM and NM) middle terms, but worst
when evaluating standard quaternio terminorum with P middle
terms than metaphorical (CM and NM) middle terms. These
results suggest that strong arguments with metaphorical middle
terms are more difficult to evaluate than arguments with literal
P middle terms, because metaphors in the first premise act
anyway as framing strategies influencing the reading of the
overall argument. This would also explain why, in the case of
wrong answers, participants took less time to evaluate strong
argument with metaphorical than literal middle terms: they did
not realize the framing effect of metaphors, implicitly influencing
their reading of the overall argument. On the contrary, the
patently false conclusion of standard quaternio terminorum
might be more easily attributed by participants to the presence
of metaphors in the first premises, altering the perception of
the truth conditions and to the irrelevant literal property made
explicit in the second premise, not applicable to the target in
the conclusion of the argument. Instead, when evaluating a
quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion, participants
overall performed worse than both the case of strong arguments
and standard quaternio terminorum and especially in the case
of metaphorical than literal middle terms, suggesting that the
framing effect of metaphors might be particularly strong and
alter participants’ beliefs in the reading of the argument with
plausible conclusion. Therefore, these results suggest that the
answer to Q1 – “Are people more prone to commit a faulty
analogy/quaternio terminorum fallacy in case of literal terms or
in case of metaphors?” – is the following R1:
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R1: People are more prone to commit a quaternio
terminorum fallacy in the case of syllogisms with plausible
conclusion compared to syllogisms with false conclusion.
In the case of plausible conclusion, people are more prone
to fall into the fallacy when middle term is a metaphor
(metaphoric fallacy) rather than a literal term.
The metaphorical NM middle term condition is anyway the
most difficult compared to both the literal and the metaphorical
CM middle term conditions (see Supplementary Table 6). This
could be due to the fact that, as the results of the rating studies
showed, novel metaphors were more unfamiliar, difficult to
interpret and perceived as less meaningful in a narrow context
compared to conventional metaphors: participants needed to
think more and offer further explanations to justify the premises
as true. The narrow context of the syllogism makes it more
difficult to interpret novel metaphors in the first premise and
to assess whether the property made explicit in the second
premise might be properly attributed to the target: the availability
of a wider context would have helped participants to make
sense not only of the NM middle term but also of the overall
argument featuring a novel metaphor (Gildea and Glucksberg,
1983; Glucksberg and Estes, 2000; Lai et al., 2009). This would
explain the significant lower number of correct answers in the
case of strong argument with NM middle terms compared to
literal (H and P) and CM middle terms. Instead, in the case of
standard quaternio terminorum, the “patent falsity” of the novel
metaphor and the conclusion might have helped the participants
in discarding the argument as fallacious. This would explain the
higher number of correct answers and the shorter response time
in the case of standard quaternio terminorum with NM middle
terms as compared to P middle terms. Compared to response
times required to disambiguate H middle terms in the case of
quaternio terminorum, no significant difference with response
times required to disambiguate NM middle terms would be
justified by the fact that in both cases two completely divergent
meanings need to be processed. Interestingly, standard quaternio
terminorum with CM middle terms required a longer response
time to be evaluated as compared to P middle terms, probably
because the covert framing effect and the set of properties
stereotypically associated with the conventional metaphor need
to be inhibited in the second premise to evaluate a property not
applicable to the metaphor target.
In any case, the previous literature coming from different
theoretical approaches agrees on the fact that novel metaphor
comprehension is more demanding in terms of contextual
and encyclopedic knowledge (Glucksberg and Estes, 2000;
Glucksberg, 2003; Giora, 2003; Bambini et al., 2016; Kenett
et al., 2018), as a completely creative meaning, divergent from
the literal one, is intended. In particular, when evaluating
quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion, participants
might have taken a longer time in the case of NM middle
terms as compared to P and CM middle terms, because of
the search of a creative meaning of NM that is able to make
sense of the plausible conclusion. Quaternio terminorum with
plausible conclusion featuring a novel metaphor were easier to
detect than those featuring a conventional metaphor, even though
they took longer to process. The interpretation process of novel
metaphors diverges from that of conventional metaphors, as
the literal meaning would not be suppressed and might endure
eliciting conscious communicated affective and imagistic effects
(Indurkhya, 2007b, 2016; Thibodeau and Durgin, 2008; Carston,
2010). While conventional metaphors are processed faster as
they activate a tacit system of commonplaces including the
relevant properties associated with the conventional meaning of
the metaphor, novel metaphors took longer to process because
participants were aware of the fact that a completely new, creative
meaning, divergent from the literal one had to be generated in the
argumentation. Therefore, the results suggest that the answer to
Q2 – “Does the conventionality of metaphors play any role in case
of a metaphoric fallacy?” – is the following R2:
R2: CM middle terms are the most reliable predictor of the
metaphoric fallacy with plausible conclusion compared to
NM middle terms. It is probably because arguments with
NM middle terms are consciously processed as leading to
new and creative metaphorical interpretations.
EXPERIMENT 2
In the second experiment, our goal was to understand why
participants were more prone to accept a quaternio terminorum
with plausible conclusion as sound, especially in the case
of a metaphoric fallacy. We therefore tested how different
factors (understandability, convincingness, emotional appeal,
logical relation, ambiguity, belief in the conclusion, real
world experience) contribute to the participants’ evaluation of
arguments with plausible conclusion, comparing literal (H and
P) and metaphorical (CM and NM) middle terms conditions.
Design and Predictions
The study had a 1× 4 experimental design: 1 argument structure
condition (quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion)× 4
(H, P, CM, NM) middle term conditions. The detection of the
ambiguity of the meanings of the middle term in the premises
was expected to be the most important reason to answer that
the conclusion did not follow from the premises independently
of the middle term condition, thus evaluating the quaternio
terminorum – even though with a plausible conclusion – as
a fallacious argument based on lexical ambiguity. We also
expected that the perceived understandability of the argument
and perceived logical relation between premises and conclusion
might influence the participants’ evaluation of the argument
soundness.
We did not expect participants to find the arguments
emotionally appealing as we explicitly avoided the middle terms
with definite emotional meanings. We did instead expect that
the believability of the conclusion would strongly influence the
evaluation of the arguments, as previous literature testified (Evans
et al., 1983; Oakhill et al., 1989; Oakhill and Garnham, 1993;
Ball et al., 2006; Correia, 2011). The belief in the conclusion was
expected to be most rated in the CM middle term condition,
because of the covert metaphorical framing effect influencing
participants’ beliefs.
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Participants
Fifty participants (31 women, 8 men, 1 other, Mage = 26.62 years,
SDage = 4.88 years) were recruited from the University of
Cagliari for the experiment. All of them had Italian as their
first language and did not previously follow courses in logic
and/or argumentation theory. The study was approved by the
ethics committee of the Department of Education, Psychology,
Philosophy at the University of Cagliari and written informed
consent was obtained from all the participants.
Materials
The stimulus material for Experiment 2 consisted of 48
arguments in Italian, composed by a subset of the materials used
in Experiment 1, i.e., the set of N = 24 quaternio terminorum
with plausible conclusion combined with 6 × H, P, CM, NM
middle terms (see Supplementary Table 10 in Appendix, column
“Quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion,” for the subset
of materials in Italian used in Experiment 2), and N = 24 fillers
as clearly strong arguments without lexical ambiguous middle
terms.
Procedure
To conduct the experiment, an online Google form was created.
The arguments were randomly shown to participants. After
gathering initial information about language and education,
participants were asked the yes/no question on whether
the conclusion of the given argument followed from the
premises, as in the first experiment. Then they were asked the
following questions related to understandability, convincingness,
emotional appeal, logical relation, ambiguity, belief in the
conclusion and real world experience:
Understandability: Do you understand the argument?
Convincingness: Is the argument convincing in anyway?
Emotional appeal: Is the argument emotionally appealing?
Logical relation: Is the conclusion logically related to
premises?
Ambiguity: Is the ambiguity at any level influencing?
Belief in the conclusion: Do you believe in C (independent of
P1 and P2)?
Real world experience: Do you have any experience of
similar arguments?
Participants were asked to rate the arguments for each
question on the scale of 1–5 (1 being least likely and 5 being most
likely). The average time to finish the experiment was 30 min.
Results
A linear regression analysis was performed on the data. Separate
linear models were created for 4 conditions (H, P, CM, and
NM) in both “yes” and “no responses.” Results of the second
experiment confirmed the first experiment results as to what
concerns the answers to the yes/no question on whether the
conclusion follows from the premises [H (Yes = 83.75%;
No = 16.25%)], [P (Yes = 91.75%; No = 8.25%)], [CM
(Yes = 82.5%; No = 17.5%)], [NM (Yes = 85%; No = 15%)].
When the conclusion was perceived to be following from the
premises, the results showed that, for any middle term type,
understandability and belief in the conclusion were significant
predictors for committing the fallacy of quaternio terminorum
[Understandability: H (t(48) = 3.7; p < 0.001), P (t(48) = 3.15;
p < 0.01), CM (t(48) = 2.85; p < 0.01), and NM (t(48) = 2.65;
p < 0.001); Belief in the conclusion: H (t(48) = 3.7; p<0.001),
P (t(48) = 3.42; p < 0.01), CM (t(48) = 3.9; p < 0.05), and NM
(t(48) = 3.6; p< 0.01)]. Logical relation was a significant predictor
in the case of H [t(48) = 3.65; p < 0.01] and CM [t(48) = 3.9;
p < 0.01] middle terms conditions. However, ambiguity was
a significant predictor for recogniszing the fallacy of quaternio
terminorum when the conclusion was seen not to be following
from the premises in P [t(48) = 3.58; p < 0.01], CM [t(48) = 4.7;
p < 0.001], and NM [t(48) = 3.2; p < 0.01] middle terms
conditions. Understandability [t(48) = 4.1; p < 0.01] and real
world experience [t(48) = 3.26; p< 0.001] were instead significant
predictor just in H middle term condition (see Supplementary
Table 9).
Discussion
The results show that when people commit the fallacy of
quaternio terminorum, independently from the middle term
type, they think to have understood the argument and
they believe in the conclusion of the (fallacious) argument,
independent from its premises. Just in the case of H middle
terms and CM middle terms, they also think to have found a
logical relation. While in the case of fallacious arguments with
H middle terms participants believing in the conclusion might
simply have searched for a possible (logical) connection between
the two meanings of the middle term to justify their answer, in the
case of fallacious arguments with CM middle terms, the covert
framing effect of the conventional metaphor might have played
a major role in both believing in the conclusion and thinking
of having found a logical relation. Indeed, the framing effect
of the conventional metaphor and the property made explicit
in the second premise might have forced participants to look
at the metaphor target under a certain perspective, influencing
the overall reading of the argument and its believability. In this
sense, conventional metaphors alter participants’ perception of
the strength of the metaphoric fallacy, making it appear strong.
Interestingly, when participants detected the fallacy of quaternio
terminorum with H middle terms they did not think of ambiguity
as the main cause, even though quaternio terminorum is per
definition the fallacy of lexical ambiguity. Participants instead
recognized ambiguity as the main source of the fallacy in the case
of quaternio terminorum with metaphorical (and especially CM)
middle terms. The results therefore suggest that the answer to
Q3 – “What are the reasons for people to commit a metaphoric
fallacy?” – is the following R3:
R3: The most prominent reasons for committing a
metaphoric fallacy is the understandability of the argument
and the participants’ belief in the conclusion of the
argument, independent of its premises. The most
prominent reason for detecting the metaphoric fallacy
is ambiguity.
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Previous literature on the effect of the belief in the conclusion
in the evaluation of literal arguments have already shown
that there is a conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic
reasoning: people are more likely to endorse arguments whose
conclusion appears believable (Evans et al., 1983; Ball et al., 2006;
Correia, 2011). It also showed that, especially in the case of a
believable conclusion, which is not in contrast with the premises,
participants tend to feel justified in confirming their own belief
in the conclusion, even though it does not follow from the
premises. Logic should be accepted in spite of the believability
of the conclusion, but participants tend to read the premises and
make sense of the overall argument by confirming their own
(prior) beliefs concerning the conclusion (Baron, 1988; Kunda,
1999).
In the second experiment, we investigated if the belief bias
influenced metaphorical arguments as well. When comparing the
results of the second experiment on the reasons why participants
considered the metaphoric fallacy as a strong argument, in both
CM and NM middle term conditions, participants indicated
to have understood the argument and to firmly believe in
the conclusion independent of its premises. However, only in
the case of CM middle terms they indicated to have found a
logical relation. In this regard, novel metaphors seem to be less
persuasive compared to conventional metaphors. This might
be due to the fact that, in the narrow argumentative context,
conventional metaphors are subconsciously perceived as true,
while novel metaphors are known to elicit creative interpretations
that depart from the conventional, literal meanings. Moreover,
in the case of NM middle terms, participants were aware from
the very beginning that their own beliefs play a major role
in the creative interpretation of the premises and thus on the
evaluation of the overall argument. Indeed, they did not claim
to have found a logical relation between the premises and the
conclusion.
However, in CM middle terms condition, participants were
unaware of the metaphorical framing effect in the first premise
and probably reassessed the overall argument on the basis of
their conscious belief in the conclusion. Thus, in the case of
arguments with believable conclusion, participants may have
reinterpreted the premises of the arguments with conventional
metaphors in order to make sense of the believed conclusion
and pretending to have found the proper logical connection
between the conclusion and the premises of the argument.
In this process, it seems that the conventional metaphor is
revitalized as it is no more interpreted with its conventional
meaning, but with an alternative, new and creative meaning that
is able to justify the believed conclusion. The new reading of
the metaphor in the first premise is extended to the conclusion
through the second premise in order to make the conclusion
follow from the premises. The second premise makes a property
explicit, which is not part of the relevant set of properties
commonly associated with the metaphor and shared by the
source and the target, but that might be plausibly mapped onto
the target in the conclusion of the argument. The arguments
with a plausible conclusion and CM middle terms are thus
interpreted metaphorically on the whole. Therefore, the answer
to Q4 – “What is the role of belief in the conclusion in
the case of metaphoric fallacy?” – might be the following
R4:
R4: The belief in the conclusion leads participants
to reinterpret the overall argument, finding alternative
reasons to make the premises consistent with the believed
conclusion. Especially in the case of CM middle terms,
a process of revitalization of the metaphor seems to be
required to extend the new metaphorical interpretation to
the overall argument.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
The main findings of our experiment are that the type of
argument structure and the type of middle term influence
participants’ evaluation of the arguments, the metaphoric fallacy
included. Indeed, the results suggest that the structure of
quaternio terminorum with plausible conclusion is by far
the most difficult to evaluate compared to both the strong
argument, where the middle term is used with the same
meaning in both the premises and the standard quaternio
terminorum structure, where the patently false conclusion
facilitates the detection of the fallacy. The results also suggest
that arguments’ evaluation depends on the specific lexical
disambiguation process of the middle term meanings in the
premises: in general, literal middle terms (and especially H
middle terms) made it easier to evaluate an argument than
metaphorical middle terms (especially NM middle terms).
In the case of quaternio terminorum, H middle terms are
easier to disambiguate even when compared to P middle
terms, because the disambiguation process deals with two
completely different meanings and thus with no possible
overlapping properties, while literal P middle terms are the
most difficult to evaluate because the disambiguation process
involves specific properties of the same semantic domain,
which have to been evaluated and compared with the property
made explicit in the second premise. A similar process of
disambiguation is in place in the case of CM middle terms,
even though, in the case of standard quaternio terminorum,
the patent falsity of the conclusion might be more easily
attributed to the presence of a metaphor in the first premise
and to the patently irrelevant property (not stereotypically
associated with the conventional metaphor) in the second
premise. On the contrary, in quaternio terminorum with
plausible conclusion condition, participants performed better in
P middle terms rather than CM middle terms condition, whose
covert framing effect might have further influenced participants’
evaluation.
In the case of the metaphoric fallacy, the plausibility of the
conclusion might have led participants to search for alternative
interpretation of the metaphor in the first premise with longer
response times, especially in the case of NM middle terms.
However, the metaphoric fallacy with plausible conclusion tends
to be evaluated as a strong argument especially when the
metaphor is conventional rather than novel. Diversely from
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1815
fpsyg-09-01815 September 22, 2018 Time: 13:41 # 12
Ervas et al. Creative Argumentation
creative metaphors, conventional metaphors are not neutral with
respect to the participants’ beliefs as they entail a framing effect
associated with a system of commonplaces usually held to be true
and covertly activated (Lakoff, 2004; Thibodeau and Boroditsky,
2011, 2013). When the analogy settled via a CM middle term
leads to a faulty, but plausible conclusion, there might arise
“a conflict between two types of thought processes, one logical
reasoning according to the instructions and the other a response
on the basis of their prior beliefs” (Evans, 2004, p. 139–140). The
main finding of the second experiment is that this conflict is at
work in the case of metaphoric fallacy with plausible conclusion,
where the participants’ belief in the conclusion might force
them to search for alternative reasons to connect the believed
conclusion and the premises. This process might be implicit in
the case of CM middle terms, where participants also believed
to have found a logical relation, and might lead to a creative
revitalization of conventional metaphors (Goldstein et al., 2012)
and generation of alternative interpretations in the light of the
believed conclusion.
Overall, the experiments suggest that while novel metaphors
consciously lead participants toward creative interpretations
from the very beginning, i.e., when they read the first premise
featuring the metaphor, conventional metaphors covertly
influence their reading of the argument, especially when the
conclusion is believable. In this sense, arguments with believable
conclusion featuring CM middle terms are more persuasive
than arguments featuring NM middle terms. As it happens
in many cases of biases inducing to fallacies (Correia, 2011),
the participants believing in the conclusion are unaware of
committing to a faulty analogy and creatively searching for
alternative reasons to adjust the interpretation of the premises
to align them with the conclusion. The revitalization of the
conventional metaphor CM and the creative interpretation
of the premises are therefore guided by the need to confirm
participants’ belief in the conclusion.
The literature on “confirmation bias,” i.e., the tendency to
favor information confirming one’s own beliefs, is quite vast
(see Oswald and Grosjean, 2004 for a review), and started with
Bacon’s “Novum Organum” (1620: XLVI), where he stated that
“the human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion
(either as being the received opinion or as being agreeable to
itself) draws all things else to support and agree with it”. Far
from being irrational, people are motivated to preserve their
own beliefs and they are able to find alternative reasons to
maintain them, postponing the actual logical relation between
premises and conclusion. Especially when this phenomenon
occurs unintentionally, the interpretation of the premises seems
to come from a process of selective evidence collection required
to confirm participants’ (prior) beliefs on the conclusion part
(Baron, 1988; Oakhill et al., 1989; Kunda, 1990; Ball et al., 2006).
In the case of syllogistic reasoning featuring a metaphor in
the first premise, the main source of evidence to maintain the
conclusion is the second premise, making explicit the property
of the source to be mapped onto the target. The property might
either belong to the set of (literal) properties of the source not
applicable to the target, or to the set of (metaphorical) properties
shared by the source and the target, as they have been associated
with the conventional meaning of the metaphor. In the first case,
a patently false conclusion should derive and be easily recognized,
while in the second case a true conclusion should be derived from
the use of the same metaphorical meaning in both the premises.
It is possible to speculate that plausible conclusions in
metaphoric fallacies might come from premises making explicit
either a property belonging to the set of (literal) properties of the
target, or to the set of “emergent properties” of the metaphor,
i.e., properties that are not associated with neither the source
nor the target (Gineste et al., 2000; Wilson and Carston, 2006).
For instance, when we say that someone is a “bulldozer” or
a “block of ice,” the relevant property of “being insensitive”
or “being reserved” do not belong, respectively, to the source
concept of “bulldozer” or “block of ice,” but “emerge” from
the metaphorical use of those words. Especially in the case of
novel metaphors, the emergence of properties is not directly
connected to the source and/or shared by the source and the
target, but might be linked either to a conceptual combination
of the target and the source domains based on the encyclopedic
knowledge about them (Glucksberg and Estes, 2000; Wilson and
Carston, 2006; Vega Moreno, 2007), or to the images evoked by
the source and the target concepts mentioned in the metaphor
(Davidson, 1978; Indurkhya, 2006, 2007b, 2016; Carston, 2010).
We can hypothesize that similar processes are activated in the
revitalization of conventional metaphors for the creative search
of reasons to confirm the conclusion. The presence of narrow
argumentative context given by the second premise affects the
process of revitalization in two main ways. First, it explicitly alters
the relevant information that might be included in the source
concept, which in turn affects the contextual assumptions and
implications of the metaphor. Second, it puts forward certain
goals, expectations or even imagined scenarios in the evaluator
of arguments with a metaphorical middle term. The inferences
that can be drawn from certain goals, expectations and imagined
scenarios are a form of backward inference from an expected
conclusion to the premises needed to derive it (Wilson and
Carston, 2006; Mazzone, 2015). Therefore, in the accidental
comparison by analogy, i.e., based on properties that essentially
neither belong to the metaphor nor to the literal source, the
compared concepts are contextually redefined (Indurkhya, 1992;
Vega Moreno, 2007; Goldstein et al., 2012; Macagno et al., 2014).
This process of modulation and adjustment of the premises in
order to derive the believed conclusion leads to the revitalization
of the metaphor even in a narrow argumentative context, such
as the one presented to the participants of the experiments, and
solicit a more creative style of reasoning when compared to the
conventional use of a metaphor.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The results presented in this article raise various interesting
questions on the creative role of metaphors in reasoning. An
aspect that needs further examination is related to the effect of the
figure of the syllogism on the evaluation of arguments (Dickstein,
1978; Oberauer et al., 2005) as the order of the words influences
the sequential reading and interpretation of the argument. This
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is particularly interesting in the case of metaphors, whose
directionality effect (Black, 1954, 1962; Tversky, 1977; Goodblatt
and Glicksohn, 2017; Indurkhya and Ojha, 2017) might interfere
with the directionality of the syllogistic figure used. In this
perspective, data on the salience of the properties, the kind of
properties (of the target/of the source/shared/emergent) (Gineste
et al., 2000) and properties coherence (Weiland et al., 2014)
of metaphors should definitely be taken into account. Another
interesting aspect that can be investigated is related to the effect
of the emotional meaning of the middle terms on the evaluation
of the arguments. In the present study we selected middle terms
with “emotionally neutral” meaning. However, emotions have
been shown to act as framing strategies that influence reasoning
(De Sousa, 1987; Damasio, 1994; Frijda et al., 2000), it would
be interesting to investigate whether and to what extent the
detection of the metaphoric fallacy is influenced by the presence
of a metaphor based on an “emotive word” (Stevenson, 1944;
Macagno and Walton, 2010; Macagno, 2017a), i.e., positive- or
negative-valenced word.
A possible limitation of the study regards its ecological
validity, even though the results are potentially interesting to
further research in specific contexts or real-life settings. For
instance, the contextual information of an argument might be too
narrow to produce the typical imagistic effect novel metaphors
possess (Carston, 2010; Indurkhya, 2016), and a wider context
might also influence participants’ perception of metaphors as
true and/or awareness of the entailed framing effect (Thibodeau
and Boroditsky, 2011, 2013; Kövecses, 2015). Presenting a wider
context where the argument is inserted, participants might come
up with more and varied emergent properties of the metaphor
as well as with more creative solutions to make the premises fit
the believed conclusion. Further research is therefore required to
shed a light on the mechanisms of the creative use of metaphors
in argumentation.
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